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Abstract 
The paradigmatic bases, which sustain traditional western psychological interpretative 
efforts, need not be just a footnote to Plato. In this paper we introduce the Talmudic 
interpretative perspective, which we use to point at some weaknesses we identify in 
contemporary research imaginings. While the empiricist approach may be traced to Plato 
and the interpretative and the critical approaches may be traced to Heraclitus, we argue 
that the Talmudic approach is a differentiated and unique perspective that, because of its 
non-epistemic nature, its dialogical character, and its recognition of two intermingled 
levels of interpretation, can make an important contribution to new ways of thinking 
about understanding and meaning in research.  
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1. Bacon’s Amnesia: A Prologue 
J. L. Borges opens one of his fictions with an insight he attributes to Francis Bacon: 
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Solomon saith: There is no new thing upon the earth. So that as Plato had 
an imagination, that all knowledge was but remembrance; so Solomon 
giveth his sentence, that all novelty is but oblivion (Borges, 2000, p. 183). 
We find this piece particularly illuminating because it presents us with several 
commonsensical statements that, taken as a whole, direct us to a surprising conclusion--
like a paradox. Let us try to reconstruct the above statement in order to make it clear. 
First, we have the notion that there is nothing new under the sun, an idea that has the 
unpopular fundamentalist flavor of the denial of real progression and an orientation 
toward the past. Second, the above excerpt points in the direction of the famous Platonic 
suggestion that knowledge is remembrance. That is, to know something is actually to 
recall it, either from the soul’s previous travels in the heavenly realm (as suggested in the 
Platonic dialogues) or from our past intellectual history (for a full discussion on these 
issues, see Neuman, 2003). 
Given those two arguments, we may reach the surprising conclusion: what we consider as 
new is in fact the result of a process of oblivion, a result of our amnesia. We are both 
what we remember and what we forget. Indeed, in his seminal work Arguing and 
Thinking, Michael Billig (1987) critically exposes this kind of amnesia among main-
stream social psychologists and, as a devoted antiquarian, urges them to turn their head 
and to look back into earlier times in order to recognize the wisdom of past generations 
and the relevance of their ideas to our current psychological studies. This is the aim of 
our paper: to suggest that sometimes when we look backwards, when we re-search 
(search again), we may find interesting ideas that may revitalize the way we understand 
the meaning of understanding and the nature of research. 
In this paper, we adopt Billig’s advice and, consequently, we design it like a cinematic 
event that brings forth images from the past (of Talmudic sages), in order to integrate 
them with our more current knowledge. While so doing, we take issue with the present 
conceptions of understanding and meaning, as these have evolved in research in the 
social sciences in general, and in social psychology in particular; we try to enrich them 
with traditions which, though not totally new seem still in need of support so as to 
revitalize a rather modern Eurocentric field. We wish to help overcome Bacon’s amnesia: 
to reflect critically on our past just to make it open to novel ways of understanding in the 
present. 
The first section aims to take us back to the past, before Dilthey, Marx, or Habermas had 
established their theories, and to review the two grand western narratives of interpretation 
which serve as the basis for present positivist-empiricist and critical conceptualizations: 
the Platonic and the Heraclitic. We then introduce the Talmudic interpretative 
perspective (the Talmud is the body of Jewish civil and ceremonial traditionary law, 
collected, codified, and redacted from about 200 to 500 AD), which we use to point at 
some weaknesses we identify in contemporary social psychological research imaginings 
on understanding and meaning. While the positivist-empiricist approach may be traced to 
Plato’s conviction on the immaculate and truthful nature of the unobservable form, the 
Published online by ICAAP 
http://www.icaap.org
Journal of Research Practice
1(1), Article P1, 2005
http://jrp.icaap.org/index.php/jrp/article/view/3/5                                                                          Page 2 of 11
love and study of which are at the center of any life worth living, and the interpretative 
and the critical approaches may be traced to Heraclitus’ law of process and opposition 
and his principles on nature’s fluidity and subsequent lack of Truth, we argue that the 
Talmudic approach is a differentiated and unique perspective that, because of its non-
epistemic nature, its dialogical character, and its recognition of two intermingled levels of 
interpretation, can be of vast significance to new ways of thinking about understanding 
and meaning in research. 
2. Out of the Platonic Cave and Inside the Heraclitian Text 
For Plato, the only way in which we may understand the meaning of a phenomenon is 
through in-sight into our soul--an insight that aims to uncover the abstract, firm and 
genuine nature of reality. To recall Plato’s famous cave allegory, all of us are prisoners 
held captive by our senses. The only way to get out of the cave is by overcoming the 
misleading factors of appearance and by observing the pure forms that underlie them. 
Although modern science is far removed from some of Plato’s wilder epistemological 
speculations, Plato’s vision dominates the popular image of science as the removal of the 
curtain, which obscures the “nature of our nature.” This Platonic ideal of interpretation is 
also the ideal of mainstream experimental psychology that seeks for the general and 
abstract “rules of the mind.” While the Platonic perspective is the most familiar to the 
general audience, it is definitely not the only player in the game. 
Heraclitus (500 BCE) holds the keys to a different approach. This tradition of inquiry 
emphasizes the dynamics of reality and our ability to reveal its existence not by removing 
the “screen of appearances” but by rearranging the riddle of appearances in a way that 
corresponds to the latent structure of reality (Kahn, 1981). Due to the fact that Heraclitus 
left only short puzzling fragments, it is quite difficult to argue with complete confidence 
that he had a coherent theory of interpretation. However, some scholars contend that this 
is possible, and it is worth inquiring into their speculations. 
The name Heraclitus is usually associated with the famous fragment--panta rhei--
everything flows. This fragment portrays Heraclitus as the theorist of a universal flux. 
Hussey (1999) suggests that for Heraclitus, process is “the basic form of existence in the 
observable world, although something, not directly observable, persists throughout” (p. 
99). Like many other philosophers, Heraclitus is aware that the senses cannot provide us 
with clear insight into reality since they are already shaped by our preconceptions: “Eyes 
and ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the language.” 
Therefore, “the possibility of understanding is correlated with the existence of a meaning. 
It implies the need for interpretation of what is given in experience, as though it were a 
riddle or an oracle” (Hussey, 1999, pp. 90-91, our emphasis). According to this 
interpretation, there is a reality; there is a truth waiting for us to reveal it. However, this 
truth is hidden, and there is no algorithmic way to uncover it. In this sense, Heraclitus 
precedes some “modern” philosophers of science (e.g., Paul Feyerabend) who question 
the existence of “the” scientific method. Another surprising aspect of Heraclitus’ theory 
is his elaboration of a social theory of epistemology. Not that he denies there is a true 
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structure underlying the appearances. However, he suggests that since there is no 
algorithm that may lead us beyond the screen of appearances, we should rely only on 
indirect ways of encountering the truth and confirm our findings through some kind of 
social agreement. While this sounds most peculiar, the argument is not that any statement 
about the structure of the universe should be based on some kind of social fashion, but 
rather that the heart of any scientific activity is interpretation, which is a social activity; 
the result of this activity is so clear that it is evident to the public and cannot escape social 
recognition. In this sense, Kuhn’s conception of a socially grounded scientific paradigm 
and “postmodern” perspectives, which emphasize the interpretative nature of the 
scientific enterprise, clearly correspond to Heraclitus’ ancient theory of interpretation. 
Concerning the above arguments, one can immediately see the theoretical affinity 
between the Heraclitian ideas of interpretation, Dilthey’s notion of hermeneutic and 
understanding, modern thinkers (e.g., Wittgenstein) who place language as a central key 
for understanding our psychological realm, and critical thinkers who believe that our 
discourse reflects and constitutes the macro-structure of our society. 
Both Plato and Heraclitus are immersed in an epistemological quest. Both of them accept 
the qualitative gap between the world of appearances (text) and the world of ideas 
(truth/meaning). Both of them would like us to look beyond the text, discourse, 
phenomenon, or appearance and to uncover the logos that governs our mind/nature. The 
difference between them is that Plato believes that in order to uncover the meaning of a 
text we should transcend it through a specific scientific methodology, while Heraclitus 
suggests that the text should be reconstructed in a way that spontaneously reveals its 
meaning. That is, Heraclitus suggests that we should understand the text through 
reconstruction, which is legitimized post hoc by a scholarly consensus. 
The western mind, with its Platonic and Heraclitian perspectives, is immersed in 
epistemological doubts, and as such it has found it difficult to overcome 
idealist/universalist or individualist perspectives. Therefore, it must be extremely difficult 
for it to consider the possibility that there are non-epistemic perspectives of interpretation, 
social and local products of a recursive process of constitution and reconstitution. Our 
suggestion is that a non-epistemic, dialogical/local/social perspective of interpretation 
exists and is expressed in the Talmud, the canonized corpus of Jewish commentary on the 
Jewish law. This perspective is non-epistemic in the sense that it does not adopt as its 
base line the difference between text and meaning, truth and appearances. We would like 
to argue that the Talmudic perspective, which is not exactly positivist-empiricist, 
interpretative, or critical/emancipatory, is a constitutive perspective, and that it is the 
most appropriate perspective for studying social psychological issues related to 
understanding and meaning. 
3. A Lesson from Stubborn Talmudic Sages 
While current Jewish scholarship has undertaken to introduce contemporary theories of 
interpretation into the study of Jewish culture and history (for a recent review, see 
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Kepnes, 1996), our effort moves in the opposite direction. We will be looking at the 
Talmudic text and its interpretation so as to reflect on its potential to affect present 
western social theorizing. The Talmudic case we would like to present (Babylonian 
Talmud, 1990-1994, pp. 286-287) in order to illustrate our argument, concerns a dispute 
among several Talmudic sages regarding the question of whether a specific kind of oven 
can or cannot be restored to its ritually pure state; that is, whether a specific kind of oven 
is subject to the Jewish laws of defilement or whether it is an oven that cannot be 
rendered impure and therefore the laws of defilement do not apply. 
This question seems a little bit bizarre to the modern secular mind, but to those scholars 
engrossed in issues of impurity, in the theological rather than the hygienic sense, this 
issue was an integral part of their world. Though the question at hand is of importance in 
that it is particular and local and not in search of universal rules, what we want to 
emphasize first is rather the drama that evolves out of this specific dispute. 
At the beginning of this story, we are told that a leading sage, Rabbi Eliezer, declares that 
the oven may be broken down (because it is made up of discrete units) and therefore is 
not susceptible to becoming ritually impure. This is his position in the debate. The other 
sages do not agree with Rabbi Eliezer and declare that the oven is indeed susceptible to 
becoming ritually impure. Then our story begins: 
On that day Rabbi Eliezer produced all the arguments in the world, but 
they did not accept them from him. So he said to them, “If the law accords 
with my position, this carob tree will prove it.” The carob was uprooted 
and moved from its place by a hundred cubits [an ancient measure of 
length derived from the forearm]--and some say, four hundred cubits. 
What we see is that after trying to convince the other sages in a rational way by providing 
arguments in favor of his position, Rabbi Eliezer gives up all attempts at rational 
persuasion and tries to change the other sages’ minds through the use of supernatural 
validation. Surprisingly (or not), the carob tree that was located near the sages is uprooted 
and moves from its place in support of the Rabbi’s argument. (Most rhetoricians would 
very much like to have such a persuasive tool at hand.) Does this supernatural proof 
convince the Talmudic sages? No. And they respond to this miracle by saying: 
“There is no proof from a carob tree.” 
Rabbi Eliezer was a leading sage and a descendent of Moses himself, a sage not to be 
easily dismissed. Therefore, the response he received from the other sages to his miracle 
must have been quite shocking. So he tried another miracle and said: 
“If the law accords with my position, let the stream of water prove it.” The 
stream of water reversed its flow. 
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At this point in the story, the reader feels assured that the sages must be convinced by 
Rabbi Eliezer’s position. One miracle, such as a migrant carob tree, may be dismissed as 
a magician’s trick, but a stream of water that reverses its flow? This is something 
contrary to the basic laws of physics and should have been considered a clear 
endorsement of the Rabbi’s argument. The stubborn sages seem to acknowledge this but 
they refuse to accept empirical facts as a legitimate source of evidence by saying: 
“There is no proof from a stream of water.” 
Now it seems that the Rabbi becomes very angry and frustrated and takes a dangerous 
turn: 
“If the law accords with my position, let the walls of the study hall prove 
it”, whereupon the wall of the study hall leaned to fall. 
At this risky juncture, the sages seem to lose their patience: empirical facts even if 
constructed in the narrative could be consequential. They indeed feel threatened by the 
walls of the study hall leaning upon them, and Rabbi Yehoshua rebuked the walls, 
shouting at them (the walls): 
“If Torah (the Mosaic or Jewish law; hence, a name for the five books of 
the Pentateuch and its commentaries) scholars vie with one another in 
legal issues what business is it of yours?” 
The Talmud redactor adds at this point: 
The walls did not fall, out of respect for Rabbi Yehoshua but neither did 
they right themselves out of respect for Rabbi Eliezer--and they still 
continue to lean to this day. 
Rabbi Eliezer, somewhat unhappy with the results of his last attempt, gives it one more 
try, appealing this time directly to the Almighty: 
“If the law accords with my position, let the Heaven prove it!” An echo 
came forth, saying, “What business have you with Rabbi Eliezer, for the 
law accords with his position under all circumstances!” 
Aha! This time the old Rabbi Eliezer seems to provide the stubborn Talmudic sages with 
the most powerful and convincing proof that his interpretation in the dispute over the 
oven is the correct interpretation of the Jewish law. Receiving support for your position 
from God himself is a support no one can argue with, unless... one is a Talmudic sage. 
One of the sages, Rabbi Joshua, stands up on his feet and says: 
“It is not in heaven.” 
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As interpreted by Rabbi Jeremiah, the meaning of Rabbi Joshua’s interjection is that: 
Since the Torah [the law] has already been given from Mount Sinai, so we 
do not pay attention to echoes, since you [God] have already written in the 
Torah at Mount Sinai [traditionally Mount Sinai is considered the place 
where Moses received the five books of the Law] “After the majority you 
are to incline.” 
The story is close to its climax. The Talmudic sage is arguing with God himself by 
reminding her that the majority [of sages] has the authority to decide on matters of law, 
and therefore the interpretation is in the hands of the sages, rather than the hands of God. 
Is this Talmudic sage rebelling against God herself? We assume that the readers are 
curious to see how God responds. The same curiosity pushed Rabbi Nathan to ask Elijah 
[the famous biblical prophet who was suppose to be dead at that time but suddenly turns 
up in the story!]: 
“What did the Holy One, blessed be He, do at that moment?” and he 
[Elijah] replied to him: “He laughed and said ‘My children have overcome 
me, my children have overcome me!’” [our emphasis] 
This is an amazing story. A group of sages is arguing about a specific, even technical, 
matter. One of them seems to be in the right, at least within a hierarchical theological 
system of interpretation. He is trying to convince his fellows to accept his position but 
fails to convince them through the use of the ordinary tools of rhetoric. Even though he is 
supported by astonishing miracles and also by God, the sages refuse to accept his position 
and argue against God who has commanded them to adhere to rules of interpretation and 
scholarly consensus and not to rely on miracles or empirical facts. This position sounds 
paradoxical, because the same God who created the law is evident in this specific dispute, 
and clearly supports one of the sages. 
Therefore, what is the point of reminding God that he commanded them to do something 
else in the past (“After the majority you are to incline.”)? Does he not remember it by 
himself? Is the will of God subordinate to the interpretative rules he determined? And 
why does God laugh and say, “My children have overcome me”? Does God laugh? Can 
he be overcome through social consensus and rhetoric? Is he a relativist who changes his 
laws according to social norms? Or in other words, is God postmodernist? 
We must admit that this story is very strange. It is even stranger than we tend to 
instinctively think because those sages do not present a good model of an argumentative 
activity, and if one wishes to use the above case as an example for the argumentative 
nature of the human mind (Billig, 1987), then one is in trouble. Although the Talmudic 
sages are involved in argumentative activity, they are not British barristers; that is, 
approaching them as argumentative beings per se in not our way. Let us explain why. 
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Our reading of the Talmudic story takes us back to Plato and Heraclitus. Although both 
Heraclitus and Plato present the idea of a reality as differentiated from appearance, their 
positions nevertheless differ widely. To recall our previous argument, for Plato, the world 
of appearance is a mask that covers a hidden truth. In order to uncover the truth, one has 
to tear off this mask by overcoming sense data (i.e., text) and introspect into the secrets of 
reality (i.e., meaning). In modern hermeneutic terms, we can say that the text covers the 
truth and one should transcend it in order to grasp its meaning. In contrast, our reading of 
Heraclitus suggests that the text [human behavior?] should not be neglected in order to 
reveal the latent structure of reality [computational rules of the mind?]. If the text is like a 
riddle, it should be carefully interpreted in order to organize its internal structure and 
thereby to uncover the logos which is reflected in it. This conception is highly similar to 
discursive psychology and the critical approaches to discourse analysis, and suggests that 
there is no difference between reality (meaning) and appearance (text) as there is no 
difference between nomos (convention) and physis (nature). Meaning is evident in the 
text. However, the Talmudic story takes us in another direction, far away from the 
epistemic story as told by Plato and Heraclitus. 
In general, Talmudic inquiry, as evident in the Talmudic writings, is not interested in 
epistemology and aesthetics; those domains are deeply connected, since both are nurtured 
from the tension between appearance and reality or from the tensions between 
contradicting appearances. In contrast with the Platonic (or the Heraclitian) expositions, 
which are obsessed with questions such as ‘What is beauty?’ or ‘How can we transcend 
our senses and know reality?’ the Talmud is totally indifferent to such questions. As 
suggested by Eco (1997) in a minor comment, in the Greek (and European) tradition, 
knowledge is associated with vision, while the Jewish tradition is a tradition of sound and 
voices. This comment encapsulates a profound difference between the Jewish Talmudic 
culture and the Greek culture. The Talmudic inquiry is indifferent to epistemology but 
attentive to dialogue. Talmudic inquiry is about praxis and ethics, about the way the 
divine will should be realized in man’s practice in the world or, more importantly, about 
the way people constitute God in their world by dialoging (to use a popular but overused 
term) with her. The difference between the Platonic/Heraclitian perspective and the 
Talmudic perspective is therefore a qualitative one. The Talmudic inquiry does not accept 
as its starting point a gap between logos and its representation, between reality and 
appearance (unlike the Platonic psychologist), between text and meaning, but adheres to a 
totally different position in which people practice in this world, their unique way of 
being-in-the-world. Their unique way of speaking the world is the logos. 
Let us try to be more explicit concerning the ethics and practice of the Talmudic method 
of inquiry. According to the above interpretation of the Talmudic method, logos is not 
masked by appearance, and it is not a riddle that needs solving by rearranging its 
components on the surface. Nothing is to be found behind logos. Logos as an activity 
(pragmatics) carries no meaning all in or by itself. Meaning exists neither in the text 
(appearance) nor in some kind of Platonic realm, but at the dynamic event of 
interpretation, which is social through and through. The activity, the practice (in this case 
the activity of interpretation), is what constitutes logos, which in turn constitutes the 
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meaning of the interpretative. Meaning is co-constituted in the active dialogue of 
interpretation ultimately allowing for no final significance other than the one negotiated 
and renegotiated in the next moments of its history/evolution. In this sense, our inquiry 
should focus on the way our meaning-making practices, our ways of interpreting various 
texts (throughout a historical process), materializes our own selves. 
The above becomes evident when reading the Talmudic story. Clearly the story could 
have been rendered otherwise, but the choice of the Talmudic editors point at their 
preference to emphasize two intermingled levels of interpretation. The first level is the 
interpretation of the Jewish law concerning a specific case. The second level is an 
interpretation of the interpretation process. These are the communicative and the meta-
communicative levels Bateson saw as necessary and complementary aspects of any 
communication process (Bateson, 1973). The relation between the levels is recursive. Not 
the empirical, nor the ideal, nor the interpretative will do. The sages’ decision is based on 
a scholarly consensus that receives its authority from the interpretative framework God 
instructed the sages to use. The validity of the interpretation is derived from a given 
interpretative framework (the whole). At the same time, the interpretative framework 
receives its power from the community (the sages) who adopt it as their interpretative 
framework! This is the point at which the notion of the Hermeneutic circle, the 
ourobouros (the legendary snake that bites its own tail), and many other forms of 
circularity and recursion come to mind. 
Why, however, should we bother ourselves with those ancient conceptions of 
interpretation or with strange Talmudic stories? The answer is very simple. If we would 
like to understand re-search in the humanities and the social sciences in general and in 
psychology in particular, we cannot consider people as objects that can be easily 
manipulated by human or other external factors as traditionally implied by modern 
western perspectives. 
However, and this is our main argument, if we adopt the Talmudic perspective then we 
may reach both theoretically surprising and practically relevant conclusions. The 
Talmudic perspective suggests that people are not independent variables or passive 
objects but active individuals who constitute their identity and are being constituted by 
their identity through interpretation and meta-interpretation, these being constitutive of 
each other. In other words, they are all co-participants in processes in which they become 
constitutive of, and at the same time are constituted by, the identities at play in the socio-
historical trajectory within which the actual drama evolves. 
If we adopt the Talmudic perspective for studying people in social psychological 
research, we conceive a unit of analysis we designate processual-plurality: its 
operationalization implies questioning how individuals within a process move between 
the two complementary levels of interpretation, and how this movement constitutes their 
unique form of being-in-the-world. We posit that adopting this notion implies that the 
dynamic and the struggle of interpretation and meta-interpretation should guide our quest. 
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4. Conclusions 
Earlier social psychological theorizing, by reconnecting with the old rhetorical tradition 
(Billig, 1987) has already helped move social psychological speculations on thinking and 
cognition into a wider socio-historical context (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), in which 
discursive activity, in the form of opinion-giving and argumentation, takes center stage. 
These developments have been central to liberating traditional psychological approaches 
from their mechanical understanding of human thinking as information processing and 
the following of cognitive rules (Harré, 2001). However present conceptualizations still 
fall short of overcoming the hegemony of experimental psychology strongly based in 
Eurocentric philosophical perspectives traditionally considered nothing but footnotes to 
Plato and, as such, strongly based on the mind-body dichotomy--the enlightened mind 
against the deceiving body. 
Posturing that the world structured by humans is linguistic rather than cognitive does not 
liberate our thinking from the “knowing mind” (Newman & Holzman, 1997). Seeing 
people as argumentative creatures, whether Talmudic sages or British barristers, in itself 
does not make the difference (Neuman & Levi, 2003). Our work has tried to dispel the 
implicit Eurocentric assumptions that tend to constrain the ways in which we think about 
the relationships between the research and meaning-making. We have tried to overcome 
the conceptualization of these categories as independent and related through causality. 
We offer in exchange an emphasis on the dynamic process of meaning-making which 
constitutes, in its becoming, both the selves involved in its construction and itself as a 
non-replicable event. Indeed, there is nothing behind a text; its meaning is codependent 
with, and constrained by, the available resources and the historical boundaries of the 
stage on which it is enacted. We all share response-ability in concert. Re-searchers and 
their public audit each other in a playful interpretative game. 
Diving into the past forgotten traditions and trying to bring them in dialogue with the 
contemporary ones, we have tried to offer new imaginings to current re-search in the 
social sciences in general and psychology in particular. We encourage others to plunge 
into their own local traditions and help revitalize re-search paradigms so as to overcome 
their present Eurocentrism. Needless to say, we do not mean to suggest that from now on, 
open inquiry needs to become nothing but a footnote to Talmudic arguments. 
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